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1. Summary  
In the past ten to fifteen years, there has been a ‘striking rise in discussions of politics and power 
in development policy circles’ (Laws & Marquette, 2018, p. 1) across all sectors, including calls 
for ‘greater attention to political economy in tackling climate change and development’ (Naess, et 
al., 2015, p. 535).  ‘Political will’ is the outcome of a deeply political process of contestation 
among political actors with diverse interests, motives, and incentives who come together in 
coalitions to support or oppose change.   
Analysis of this process of political contestation can be guided by frameworks that identify 
relevant political actors, clarify their interests, motives, and incentives, and understand the 
relationships among the various actors including how they form coalitions to support or oppose 
change (Developmental Leadership Program, 2018).  This rapid review briefly summarises 
several such frameworks, some of which offer general guidance about broad groups of issues 
that analysts might consider while others focus down to the level of specific factors that affect 
political outcomes.  This report also examines country case studies from Africa and a few global 
comparative studies that illustrate factors that have appeared to either support or hinder the 
building of political momentum around action on climate change.  The literature generally did not 
offer any evidence about gender issues in connection with these factors. 
The table below summarises factors influencing political momentum for action on climate change 
that emerged from the literature and where this evidence is taken from, as well as identifying 
several potential factors whose influence on political momentum was found not to be significant.  
It is important to note that these factors do not predetermine outcomes in individual countries, 
however.  They illustrate arenas for political debate, or questions to consider, but the outcomes 
that occur in each country are the result of country-specific processes of political contestation 
that may play out differently in different contexts. 
Factors influencing political 
momentum for action on 
climate change 
Evidence from 
Centralisation of power in 
government 
Global (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013) 
Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
Prospects of access to 
international funding 
Africa, Asia, Latin America (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Zambia (Casado-Asensio, Wang, Moilwa, & Drutschinin, 2014; 
Funder, Mweemba, & Nyambe, 2018) 
Tanzania (Nachmany, 2018) 
The structure and interests of the 
energy sector  
Global (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013) 
Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
Kenya (Naess, et al., 2015) 
Ghana (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Mozambique (Naess, et al., 2015) 
Africa, Asia, Latin America (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Zambia (Funder, Mweemba, & Nyambe, 2018) 
Policy coordination across 
government departments 
Africa (Lockwood, 2013) 
Africa, Asia, Latin America (Averchenkova, 2014) 
South Africa (Jakob, Flachsland, Steckel, & Urpelainen, 2019) 
Tanzania (Nachmany, 2018) 
South Africa (Trollip & Boulle, 2017) 
DRC (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Ghana (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Zambia (Averchenkova, 2014) 
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Opportunities for extension of 
state power in remote areas 
Africa (Funder, Mweemba, & Nyambe, 2018) 
Zambia (Funder, Mweemba, & Nyambe, 2018) 
Kenya (Naess, et al., 2015) 
Public knowledge about climate 
change 
Global (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013) 
Zimbabwa (Dodman & Mitlin, 2015) 
Zambia (Casado-Asensio, Wang, Moilwa, & Drutschinin, 2014) 
Africa (Eguavoen, Schulz, de Wit, Weisser, & Müller-Mahn, 2013) 
The electoral cycle Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
Africa (Lockwood, 2013) 
Zambia (Funder, Mweemba, & Nyambe, 2018) 
Zimbabwe (Dodman & Mitlin, 2015) 
Vulnerability to climate change Global (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013) 
Ghana (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Zambia (Funder, Mweemba, & Nyambe, 2018) 
Strength of civil society Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
Zimbabwe (Dodman & Mitlin, 2015) 
Framing climate change as an 
economic development 
opportunity 
Tanzania (Nachmany, 2018) 
South Africa (Rennkamp, Haunss, Wongsa, Ortega, & Casamadrid, 
2017; Jakob, Flachsland, Steckel, & Urpelainen, 2019) 
Africa (Lockwood, 2013) 
International influences on 
political space and policy options 
Kenya (Naess, et al., 2015) 
Mozambique (Naess, et al., 2015) 
Zambia (Casado-Asensio, Wang, Moilwa, & Drutschinin, 2014) 
Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
Trusting relationship between the 
public and private sectors 
South Africa (Averchenkova, Gannon, & Curran, 2019) 
Ghana (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Scientific evidence about climate 
change 
Africa, Asia, Latin America (Averchenkova, 2014) 
Tanzania (Nachmany, 2018) 
 
 
Factors that do not appear to 
influence political momentum 
for action on climate change 
Evidence from 
Left- or right-wing orientation of 
government 
Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
The business cycle and economic 
crises 
Global (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, & Collins, 2015) 
State administrative capacity Global (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013) 
Tanzania (Nachmany, 2018) 
Level of democracy Global (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013) 
 
Source: Author’s own 
2. Political will and political economy analysis frameworks 
In the past ten to fifteen years, there has been a ‘striking rise in discussions of politics and power 
in development policy circles’ (Laws & Marquette, 2018, p. 1) across all sectors.  Until recently, 
the national and local politics of climate change has received relatively little attention, but the 
importance of politics is being increasingly recognised, including in the climate change arena 
(Dodman & Mitlin, 2015, p. 223; Lockwood, 2013, p. 647; Naess et al., 2015, p. 535). 
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The term ‘political will’ is often used as shorthand for commitment and action on the part of 
political leaders, but the term has been criticised as being vague and lacking explanatory power.  
The Developmental Leadership Program1 (DLP) argues that ‘political will may be a temptingly 
simple and intuitive explanation for why reforms succeed or fail, but it is a turn of phrase 
masquerading as an explanation’ (Developmental Leadership Program, 2018, p. 8).  The DLP 
argues that political will is not exercised freely and independently by leaders, but is the outcome 
of a deeply political process of contestation.  ‘The key to opening the black box of political will lies 
in the interaction between institutions and individuals, or structures and agents. It requires a 
move… to a more dynamic and temporal view of politics as a process of contestation to establish 
the ‘collective will’’ (Developmental Leadership Program, 2018, p. 8). 
Understanding the process of political contestation whose outcome is manifested as ‘political will’ 
requires an approach to political analysis that identifies relevant political actors, understands their 
interests, motives, and incentives, and understands the relationships among the various actors 
including how they form coalitions to support or oppose change (Developmental Leadership 
Program, 2018).  Several frameworks for carrying out such analysis are briefly summarised 
below.  Some offer general guidance about broad groups of issues that analysts might consider, 
while others also focus down to the level of specific factors that affect political outcomes.  
Developmental Leadership Program 
The DLP suggests analysing the ‘black box of political will’ at three levels (Developmental 
Leadership Program, 2018, p. 9): 
 At the individual level, where motivated agents with incentives, values, interests and 
opportunities push for change;  
 At the collective level, where individuals align their interests and form coalitions with 
power, legitimacy and influence to manoeuvre and operate effectively; and  
 As a process through which coalitions contest institutions, involving legitimising and 
de-legitimising competing ideas about what is right for society.  Challenging or disrupting 
institutions involves contesting these ideas through debate and through conflict, though 
not necessarily through violence. 
Hudson, Marquette, & Waldock (2016), leading researchers in the DLP, propose a framework for 
political analysis comprising two steps, each with five questions to guide thinking: 
1. Understanding interests: What are people trying to achieve, and why? 
1.1. Is what they want clear?  
1.2. Are they acting in line with their core beliefs? 
1.3. Do you understand the constraints they face? 
1.4. Is it clear who and what the key influences on them are? 
1.5. Is their behaviour being shaped by social norms about what is appropriate? 
2. Understanding change: What space and capacity do people have to effect change? 
                                                   
1 An international research collaboration operating since 2006, carrying out research on leadership, power and 
political processes in international development: https://www.dlprog.org/  
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2.1. Are they the key decision maker?  
2.2. Do they have potential coalition partners?  
2.3. Are their key decision points clear? 
2.4. Is their framing of the issue likely to be successful? 
2.5. Are they playing on more than one chessboard? 
Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice (Laws and 
Marquette) 
A comprehensive review of the evidence on thinking and working politically in development over 
the past decade identified the following factors that have contributed to the success of 
development programmes in various sectors (Laws & Marquette, 2018, p. 8): 
 leaders were politically smart and were able to use that knowledge effectively; 
 programme managers allowed local actors to take the lead; 
 programmes adopted an ‘iterative problem solving, stepwise learning’ process; 
 programme staff brokered relationships with major interest groups; 
 donors provided flexible and strategic funding; 
 there was a long-term commitment by donors and high level of continuity in staffing; 
and 
 there was a supportive environment in the donor agency. 
The report notes, however, that ‘climate and environmental governance’ is one of eight ‘key 
sectoral gaps’ where there is little direct evidence about thinking and working politically (Laws & 
Marquette, 2018, p. 19). 
Steves and Teytelboym 
Steves and Teytelboym (2013, pp. 9-10) identified four sets of factors that they argue are likely to 
be important in influencing the political economy of climate change:  
 The international context, seen as an arena in which national governments interact 
strategically, ‘each seeking to benefit from the global climate change regime while 
reducing their costs’; 
 The structure of the government, where increasing numbers of actors who have the 
power to veto new policies (such as multiple chambers of parliament or levels of 
government with overlapping powers) leads to more difficulty in changing policy; 
 The degree of political accountability, with more responsive democracies reacting to 
the preferences of the electorate; and 
 The characteristics of interest groups which reflect underlying economic interests in 
society and the economic structure. 
The authors examined six variables from the political economy literature which have been 
identified as likely to drive climate change mitigation policy (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 16): 
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 Public knowledge of the threat represented by climate change, which in turn is believed 
to be driven by levels of tertiary education, freedom of the media, and vulnerability of the 
country to climate change; 
 The level of democracy; 
 The strength of the carbon‐intensive industry lobby; 
 State administrative capacity; 
 Per capita and total CO2 emissions; and 
 International commitments. 
These variables were identified based on the authors’ review of the political economy literature, 
but their regression analysis examining the relationships between these variables and the extent 
to which 95 countries around the world (including 16 African countries) have adopted climate 
change mitigation policies showed that the most significant variables were public knowledge 
about climate change (shaped by national vulnerability to climate change, levels of education, 
and freedom of the media), and the strength of carbon-intensive industry (Steves & Teytelboym, 
2013, pp. 23-24). 
Jakob, Flachsland, Steckel, and Urpelainen 
Jakob et al. (2019) propose a framework for guiding analysis of the political economy of energy 
and climate change policy organised around three elements:  
 The most important actors that influence policy development, including societal actors 
and political actors; 
 A list of objectives which matter for these actors, where societal actors are directly 
concerned about societal objectives, and political actors are concerned both about the 
interests of the groups they represent but also have specific political objectives; and 
 The context within which policy-making takes place, which structures how policy 
objectives affect societal actors, how societal actors influence political actors, how 
political actors influence policy formulation, and how the general environment including 
exogenous events shapes the policy process. 
In their paper, the authors provide examples of societal and political actors (such as voter 
groups, unions, energy-intensive industries, and others), as well as environmental, socio-
economic, and strategic objectives that the groups may have, and contextual factors relevant for 
formulating climate and energy policy. 
UNDP Low Emission Capacity Building Programme (Averchenkova) 
Interviews with twenty national government representatives, international practitioners, and 
private sector representatives involved in the UNDP’s Low Emission Capacity Building 
Programme identified the following factors, listed in order of importance according to the 
interviewees, that were felt to have ‘worked in getting political commitment’ to low-emission 
development (LED) strategies and nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) 
(Averchenkova, 2014, p. 12): 
 The prospect of getting donor finance to support the work; 
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 Linking proposed LED and NAMA activities to sectoral development plans and goals; 
 The image of the country in the international community; 
 Availability of good data on emissions and potential reductions; 
 Prior experience with the Clean Development Mechanism; and 
 Making a voluntary emissions pledge to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
3. Factors influencing political momentum for action on 
climate change 
Centralisation of power in government 
A strong and centralised government structure makes it easier to develop the political momentum 
necessary to pass legislation of any kind, including climate change legislation. 
A regression study looking at political economy variables in 95 countries around the world 
(including 16 African countries) and the extent to which countries have adopted climate change 
mitigation policies found that where there are more ‘veto players’ (actors whose agreement is 
necessary to enact policies, such as multiple chambers of parliament or levels of government 
with overlapping powers) with more divergent views, it is more difficult to change policy (Steves & 
Teytelboym, 2013, p. 9). 
Another regression study covering 66 countries (11 of which were African) similarly found that 
‘strong government is important for climate legislation’ (Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 59).  
‘Governments with a majority in all chambers of the legislature find it easier to legislate and are 
likely to pass more laws overall, not just laws related to climate change… the often contested 
nature of climate policy makes a strong executive particularly important’ (Fankhauser et al., 
2015, p. 59). 
Prospects for access to international funding 
Climate change discourse is used by developing countries when seeking access to international 
funds, and the prospect of accessing funding is a significant motivation for African governments.  
A survey of policy-makers and national experts in 17 countries spanning Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America participating in the UNDP’s Low Emission Capacity Building Programme found that 
‘most countries see the prospect of attracting international financing as the most critical factor in 
garnering domestic high-level political commitment to a climate-change agenda and in securing 
participation of sectorial ministries’ (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 18). 
Access to international development funding is increasingly linked to satisfying environmental 
objectives.  In Zambia, for example, official development assistance (ODA) declined from 29% of 
GNI to only 11% from 2004 to 2012, but the proportion of ODA linked to ‘green development’ 
rose from 6% to 30% over the same period (Casado-Asensio et al., 2014, pp. 16-18).  The 
country relies on climate change funding to help ‘finance operation of the rural civil service and 
technical sector agencies… freeing up government funds for other purposes’ (Funder et al., 
2018, p. 35) and is currently (in 2018) seeking investments worth USD 20 billion for climate 
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change adaptation, illustrating that ‘substantial financing is potentially in play’ (Funder et al., 
2018, p. 35) 
The prospect of access to international finance under the banner of climate change action can be 
attractive both to ‘developmental’ and ‘anti-developmental’ or ‘patrimonial’ regimes.  In so-called 
‘developmental states’, resources would be likely to be used effectively and would support 
regime legitimacy; in ‘anti-developmental’ regimes, international finance can potentially provide a 
new source of rent and resources for political patronage and regime survival, but with potentially 
limited benefits to poor people (Lockwood, 2013, pp. 664, 666-667). 
In Tanzania, a study involving interviews with government officials, civil society representatives, 
and others suggested that ‘framing issues as being about climate change was sometimes a 
‘marketing’ technique, especially for engaging with development partners.’  Interviewees reported 
that using terms such as ‘climate-smart’ was useful in engaging with international funders, many 
of whom ‘respond more positively to projects that are framed around climate change’ 
(Nachmany, 2018, p. 3). 
The structure and interests of the energy sector 
Actors in the energy sector, including industry, government, and citizens, have a strong influence 
on governments’ engagement with climate change.  Understanding the structure of the energy 
sector and the various interests within it is important for understanding the overall political 
economy of climate change.   
A regression analysis covering 95 countries worldwide found that ‘the relative strength of the 
carbon-intensive industry is a major deterrent to the adoption of climate change mitigation 
policies and measures… In many resource‐rich economies, these industries are the largest 
export earners, the largest employers and the largest contributors to the national tax base’ and 
therefore strongly influence climate change policy (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 25).  A second 
analysis of 66 countries found a similar but weaker relationship, with the number of laws related 
to climate change being ‘negatively correlated with the share of fossil fuel and mining exports in a 
country’ but not statistically significant (Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 59). 
In Kenya, ‘increasing electricity generation is among the current government’s highest priorities 
and a core strategy for driving economic growth’ but the ability of various actors and technologies 
to ‘mobilise finance and support behind their vision of development is a function of their power’  
(Naess, et al., 2015, p. 537).  There is strong interest in developing Kenya’s oil, gas, and coal 
reserves, but renewable energy technologies have managed to achieve success where they 
have been able to align with government, donor, and private sector interests.  ‘Large scale wind 
power and geothermal energy have gained traction in formal government policy processes, due 
in part to the extent to which they serve the existing development priorities of government 
agencies, the climate change concerns of donors, the commercial interests of the international 
companies that are positioned to develop the resources’ and large national business 
associations (Naess, et al., 2015, p. 538).  Grid-connected solar power ‘has been actively 
discouraged by government’ through paying low prices to private sector solar power producers, 
while small-scale off-grid solar power has been commercially successful (Naess, et al., 2015, p. 
538).   
In other African countries, the existence of fossil fuel reserves has created powerful incentives 
against investing in renewable energy.  In Ghana, it has been difficult to gain support for 
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renewable energy investment because of competition for investment from the natural gas 
industry, which is already heavily subsidised and is seeking investment in infrastructure to exploit 
new recently-discovered natural gas reserves (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 27).  Similarly, ‘both 
Kenya and Mozambique have significant fossil fuel reserves… and both countries’ energy 
trajectories could just as easily follow a high carbon as a low carbon pathway. Power will 
determine which pathway is chosen’ (Naess, et al., 2015, p. 542). 
Resistance to change from actors in the energy sector can sometimes be overcome by appealing 
to other motives.  A study of lessons learned from the UNDP’s Low Emission Capacity Building 
programme suggests that it may be possible to overcome resistance from energy ministries by 
offering new modelling and policy evaluation tools that enable them to evaluate other benefits 
such as job creation, resource conservation and reduced pollution, and helping them identify new 
financing opportunities that are aligned with their priorities (Averchenkova, 2014, pp. 16-17).   
In some cases, interests in the energy sector can align so as to support action on climate 
change.  For example, in Zambia, reduced water levels in hydropower reservoirs in 2015-16 led 
to a major energy crisis with daily power outages in urban and industrial centres.  While the 
political opposition and some technical experts argued that the crisis was caused by poor water 
and energy management, the government framed the crisis as a consequence of climate change 
and used it as ‘an opportunity for political discourse, a source of funding and an opportunity to 
show action on politically sensitive issues such as food security and energy supply’ (Funder et 
al., 2018, pp. 35-36).  
Policy coordination across government 
Climate change policy is ‘a multi-sectoral challenge that crosses many parts of government’ and 
departmental siloing is a barrier to adopting policies on climate adaptation (Lockwood, 2013, p. 
663).  This problem can be particularly serious in African countries where patrimonial regimes 
may lead to large numbers of ministerial appointments as political rewards, with the result that 
‘proliferation of ministries, each competing for resources and policy control, drives duplication 
and makes co-ordination more difficult’ (Lockwood, 2013, p. 662).  Responsibility for climate 
change often lies with environment ministries, which tend to be less powerful and have fewer 
resources than other ministries (Jakob et al., 2019, p. 14; Averchenkova, 2014, p. 11)  ‘This is a 
particularly significant challenge in Africa, where climate-change units are generally new, very 
small, with relatively little political power and struggling with multiple priorities. Such units are 
rarely integrated into the country’s development and planning work’ (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 11). 
In Tanzania, for example, ‘institutional infrastructure is somewhat lacking for systematically 
addressing climate change’ (Nachmany, 2018, p. 3), with environmental issues often managed 
between multiple line ministries with limited communication (Nachmany, 2018, p. 4).  The focal 
point for climate change is a small team in the Division of Environment in the Vice President’s 
Office which collaborates with environmental units in line ministries, but these units deal with 
multiple environmental issues, with none designated as climate-change-specific.  ‘Treating 
climate as one of multiple environmental issues means that it remains sidelined in planning 
processes’ (Nachmany, 2018, p. 3).  South Africa suffers from a similar challenge as the country 
has a complex range of policies with responsibilities spread across multiple departments, but the 
agency responsible for overall coordination, the Department of Environmental Affairs, is ‘a weak 
department in the political hierarchy’ and lacks capacity, which makes policies ‘vulnerable to 
pushback by interests that would be negatively impacted’ by them (Trollip & Boulle, 2017, pp. 29, 
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30).  Other countries have even weaker coordination mechanisms, such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, which has no comprehensive agricultural or energy strategy in place, 
making the development of mitigation strategies more challenging (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 15). 
In some circumstances, building political alliances and coordinating policy relies on ‘personal and 
historical relationships between ministries’ (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 14).  In Ghana, for example, 
‘coordination gaps have been effectively addressed due to the presence of a focal point who is 
technically knowledgeable in different areas of climate policy and who has strong networks in 
various relevant ministries’ (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 14). 
A related challenge is the lack of continuity and policy stability in many countries.  ‘Changes in 
the political power structure and in institutions result in the high turnover of decision-making 
actors’ which ‘makes it extremely difficult to build cooperation among stakeholders’ 
(Averchenkova, 2014, p. 15).  In Zambia, for example, ‘after a major restructuring of executive 
power, it has been a challenge to engage various ministries and achieve stakeholder buy-in’ to 
the UNDP’s Low Emission Capacity Development Programme (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 15). 
Opportunities for extension of state power in remote areas 
In many African countries, ‘the central state has limited reach on the ground’ and state agencies 
compete for authority with local governments, traditional institutions such as chiefdoms, and 
NGOs’ (Funder et al., 2018, pp. 32, 34-36).  These agencies and institutions compete for power 
and legitimacy, and climate change policy can be one of the arenas that provides opportunities 
for ‘asserting and legitimizing the authority and resource control of the central state in rural areas’ 
(Funder et al., 2018, p. 36), and thus be a route for gaining and consolidating power. 
In Zambia, the institutions of central government including the centrally-appointed district 
administration, state agencies, and locally-elected councils compete for influence and authority 
alongside traditional chiefs and their associated headman structures (Funder et al., 2018, p. 36).  
One example of this struggle can be seen in the districts of Kazungula and Sesheke, where 
major droughts and floods took place in the mid-2000s.  The national government framed the 
disasters as a consequence of climate change with a strong likelihood of recurrence, and not 
only provided short-term disaster relief but also took the opportunity to strengthen the 
government’s permanent presence in the districts with support from international donors.  
Controversially, the government attempted to implement a resettlement programme which took 
customary lands out of traditional chiefly control, seriously undermining a key component of the 
chiefs’ power.  In one district, the local chief acquiesced under considerable pressure to the 
resettlement scheme, but in the other, the government abandoned the scheme after strong 
resistance from the chief and local communities (Funder et al., 2018, pp. 36-40).   
In Kenya, power struggles over the process of devolution are having ‘significant implications for 
the control of energy infrastructure and policy’ (Naess, et al., 2015, p. 538).  Some counties have 
argued for more local control of the power grid, because reliable electricity supply is critical to 
attract investors, and some ‘have been enthusiastic about supporting renewable energy’ (Naess, 
et al., 2015, p. 539).  Political battles over land use are ‘acutely contested’ at the local level, such 
as in the case of a geothermal energy project which conflicts with the Maasai people’s traditional 
use of land (Naess, et al., 2015, pp. 538-539), and the outcomes of these local political conflicts 
will influence climate policy at the broader national level. 
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Public knowledge about climate change 
Public knowledge about climate change is ‘a powerful determinant of climate change policy 
adoption: worldwide, countries in which the public is aware of the causes of climate change are 
significantly more likely to adopt climate change mitigation policies than countries in which public 
knowledge is low’ (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 24). Public knowledge of climate change is in 
turn shaped by the threat posed by climate change, the national level of education and the 
existence of free media (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 24). 
In Zimbabwe, for example, ‘despite growing levels of urbanisation… even urban dwellers 
consider themselves to have a rural home’ and there is widespread understanding of the impacts 
of changing climate patterns on agriculture, with the result that ‘many government and NGO 
officials… suggest that the country as a whole is conscious of environmental and climate change 
issues because of the influence of changing patterns of rainfall on agricultural productivity’ 
(Dodman & Mitlin, 2015, p. 227).  Similarly, Zambia is considered to be well advanced in green 
planning and policy-making, with strong political will to engage on green issues, due at least in 
part to ‘relatively high levels of awareness among decision makers and the general public on 
these issues’ (Casado-Asensio et al., 2014, p. 14). 
It has been observed that in some countries, while climate change may be recognised as a 
phenomenon, the causes of it are misunderstood in ways that make it difficult to engage with as 
a political issue.  For example, Eguavoen et al. (2013) report findings from various studies that 
poorly-educated people in various countries believe that climate change or its consequences 
such as droughts, floods, are beyond human influence (Benin), or are caused by immoral social 
behaviour (Ghana, Tanzania), fictitious machinery (Senegal), or the decline of traditional 
ceremonies and beliefs (Mozambique, Tanzania).   
The electoral cycle 
A study of climate legislation in 66 countries found that in well-developed democratic systems 
‘climate legislation is not generally seen as a vote winner’ and that climate action is less likely to 
be taken close to an election (Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 59). Public debate on climate policy is 
‘framed predominantly negatively in terms of the impact climate action might have on fuel poverty 
and business competitiveness… Attempts to frame the debate in terms of new growth 
opportunities or other side-benefits are rare’ (Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 59).   
Climate change may or may not be salient as an election issue, depending on the context.  In 
some African countries, geographic areas that are more vulnerable to climate change are often 
also politically marginal and ‘receive fewer government services and goods, and suffer more from 
rent-seeking by officials (including the diversion of food aid) than do areas in the political 
heartlands’ (Lockwood, 2013, p. 663).  Where the victims of climate change are politically 
marginalised, climate change is less likely to be an electoral issue.  In Burkina Faso, ‘farmers’ 
low levels of understanding of elections, voting power and political accountability have resulted in 
little political representation of their interests’ despite their experiences of environmental 
degradation and climatic change (Eguavoen & Wahren, 2015, pp. ii, 15). 
On the other hand, climate change is a significant electoral issue in many countries.  In Zambia, 
recurring floods and droughts, the politics of food, and ‘the climate change adaptation agenda in 
Zambia serves the immediate interests of the central government well, by providing an 
opportunity for political discourse, a source of funding and an opportunity to show action on 
 12 
Helpdesk Report  
politically sensitive issues such as food security and energy supply’ (Funder et al., 2018, p. 36).  
Similarly in Zimbabwe ‘government officials and ministers state the importance of climate 
change, and it is frequently and increasingly covered in the print and electronic media’ and 
environmental issues seem to have achieved a broad political consensus, supported by the main 
political parties and less disputed than other issues (Dodman & Mitlin, 2015, p. 228). 
Vulnerability to climate change 
The literature reports mixed findings regarding the impact of a country’s vulnerability to climate 
change on political engagement.  A global study covering 95 countries finds ‘little correlation 
between countries’ vulnerability to climate change and the adoption of climate change mitigation 
policies and measures’, but this study focused on mitigation and the authors note that ‘the 
countries that are most vulnerable to climate change tend to contribute little to the problem – and 
hence tend to focus their efforts on adaptation rather than mitigation’ (Steves & Teytelboym, 
2013, p. 12).   
On the other hand, studies looking at individual countries suggest that vulnerability to climate 
change does affect countries’ engagement with climate as a political issue. 
In Ghana, for example, ‘floods, droughts and other extreme weather events are becoming more 
and more frequent realities in the country. This has led to a relatively high level of political 
awareness with respect to climate change and sustainable development in Ghana, with 
emphasis being placed on adaptation and improving climate resilience. It is also increasingly 
recognised that low-carbon development policies may be mutually supportive with existing 
national sustainable development objectives’ (Averchenkova, 2014, pp. 25-26).   
In Zambia, climate change has become a salient issue to the public as a consequence of 
recurring floods and droughts that ‘have increasingly become publicised in national newspapers 
and reported on TV’ (Funder et al., 2018, p. 34).  Disasters in isolated areas and in the capital 
are ‘reported on by national media, and questions are asked of responsible ministers and their 
staff’ which has made response ‘a matter of some priority for the political leadership’ (Funder et 
al., 2018, p. 34).  ‘Disaster relief and climate adaptation interventions typically address food 
security and smallholder agriculture on the ground, and are therefore a convenient means for the 
ruling government to display action’ and President Lungu has publicly ‘linked agriculture and food 
security concerns to climate change, and called for his ministries to address the issue’ (Funder et 
al., 2018, p. 35). 
Strength of civil society 
The strength of civil society in a country is positively correlated with a country’s adoption of laws 
related to climate change.  A study of climate-related legislation in 66 countries worldwide shows 
‘a significant positive correlation between the stock of climate change laws in a country and the 
number of national member organisations in the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature’ (Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 59).   
In Zimbabwe, civil society organisations are active in many spheres of activity, but play a 
particularly strong role in engaging with the government on climate change, which is seen as a 
cross-sectoral issue that affects the whole population, a less contested issue than some others 
(such as food security, the economy, job creation, and governance), and where there is less 
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funding at stake than in some other areas so the power struggles are not as fierce (Dodman & 
Mitlin, 2015, p. 229).   
Framing climate change as an economic development opportunity 
Action on climate change tends to be more common when climate change is framed as an 
opportunity for economic development and job creation, but the degree to which climate action is 
accepted as a path for economic development in a particular country depends on the outcome of 
national political debates. 
In Tanzania, although climate risks are evident in the country, action on climate change has 
been limited since the 2015 general election as the government ‘has prioritised rapid 
industrialisation and infrastructure development’ primarily based on fossil fuels (Nachmany, 
2018, pp. 1-2).  The reasons for this policy shift are not clear.  Currently, ‘climate considerations 
are viewed as a subset of broader agendas – climate change is often regarded as only one way 
to consider issues such as development, poverty alleviation, food security and land management‘ 
(Nachmany, 2018, p. 3) 
In South Africa, energy policy debates are primarily about economic development including 
jobs, cost, and environmental issues (emissions reduction).  Cheap electricity prices have 
attracted national and foreign electricity intensive industries (Rennkamp et al., 2017, p. 216) and 
coal is seen as a means to foster industrial development, provide cheap electricity for 
households and industry, generate revenues for state and national governments, and provide 
jobs (Jakob et al., 2019, pp. 13-14).  On the other hand, supporters of renewable energy argue 
for the possibility of creating new jobs in the ‘green economy’ while protecting existing jobs in the 
mining sector (Rennkamp et al., 2017, p. 217).  Energy policy is heavily influenced by a small 
number of powerful actors including the state-owned electrical utility Eskom, the state-owned 
energy and chemicals company Sasol, the government Department of Trade and Industry, and a 
small number of large industrial consumers particularly in the natural resources and mining 
sector (Jakob et al., 2019, p. 14).  Supporters of renewable energy policy consist ‘largely of trade 
unions, government departments, international investors, renewable energy industries, civil 
society and academic organizations’ as well as civil society actors such as environmental NGOs 
and churches (Rennkamp et al., 2017, pp. 217-218).   
Agriculture is particularly vulnerable to climate change, and in many African countries it is central 
to the livelihoods of a majority of the population and to the national economy, making it critical for 
climate change policy (Lockwood, 2013, p. 661).  In such contexts, Lockwood argues, a political 
commitment to investment in agriculture and the rural economy will be necessary as part of 
building political support for action on climate change (Lockwood, 2013, p. 662). 
International influences on political space and policy options 
International actors have a great deal of influence in national processes related to climate 
change, and often constrain and guide the political space and policy options available to national 
governments. 
In Kenya and Mozambique, ‘low carbon energy and carbon forestry still appear as 
internationally driven, with (as yet) limited national ownership’ (Naess, et al., 2015, p. 542). In 
both cases, international agencies, multilateral development banks, and international businesses 
‘have a powerful role to play in shaping decisions at national and sub-national level about which 
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development pathway to pursue’ through ‘control of finance, production, technology and trade’ 
(Naess, et al., 2015, p. 542).  Similarly, in Zambia ‘multilateral and bilateral donors have played a 
major role in the development of national policies… virtually all major policies, acts and plans 
related to disaster management and climate change adaptation in Zambia have been financially 
and technically supported by multilateral or bilateral donors’ (Casado-Asensio et al., 2014, p. 33).   
An example of how external events can stimulate political will in a country is illustrated by a 
global study that included an examination of approaches taken by left-wing and right-wing 
governments to climate change.  Although The study showed that ‘right-wing governments are 
more susceptible to external reputation effects, issuing more legislation than left-wing 
governments after hosting a global climate summit’ (Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 59).   
Trusting relationship between the public and private sectors 
Political momentum in favour of action on climate change appears to be easier to build and 
maintain where there is a trusting relationship between the government and the private sector. 
In South Africa, forums for coordination between stakeholders have been established, but 
tensions arise ‘due to mistrust, difficulties in historical relationships, and questions around the 
pace, scale and form of policies… between and within government departments, state-owned 
enterprises, academic research centres, civil society and trade unions’ (Averchenkova, Gannon, 
& Curran, 2019, p. 4).  ‘These issues are prevalent throughout South Africa’s political discourse 
and economic structure – but climate is a policy area where constructive interaction between the 
public and private sector is particularly important for making progress’ (Averchenkova, Gannon, 
& Curran, 2019, p. 4). 
In Ghana, ‘a negative experience with the CDM [clean development mechanism] in the private 
sector… resulted in lowered expectations and a loss of trust’ and sectors ‘in which competing 
economic and social interests come into conflict with low-carbon policies’ face challenges.  ‘In 
one city for example, a bus rapid transit (BRT) system is being opposed by taxi unions, despite 
assurances by the government that it will secure jobs and alternative employment opportunities 
for affected drivers. The lack of trust between the government and the private sector in such 
cases is clearly an important issue’ (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 28).  Attempts are being made to 
win business support for renewable energy based on benefits such as energy access, health 
benefits and new employment, and by capacity building and providing better information to the 
private sector, including information about incentives. (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 28) 
Scientific evidence about climate change 
Scientific evidence about climate change does not necessarily lead to political action by itself, but 
good quality evidence can help to support political commitments to engage with climate issues.  
‘Countries that have had success in mobilising political commitment at the early stages of the 
process, such as Chile, Colombia and Mexico, have all noted the importance of high-quality data 
that had already been available due to prior work in the area’ (Averchenkova, 2014, p. 14). 
In Tanzania, interviews with government officials, civil society representatives, and other 
domestic actors indicated that ‘a lack of credible, timely information to support decision-making 
is… [a] major limitation for policymakers’ (Nachmany, 2018, p. 5).  ‘High levels of uncertainty 
over future projections of rainfall… and the long-term horizons used for predicting climate 
change, can make the political assessment of climate change a low-priority issue’ (Nachmany, 
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2018, p. 3).  Interviewees cited a need for scientific information as well as for policy options and 
recommendations, while noting that policymakers had limited capacity to engage with academic 
outputs and needed research findings to be presented more concisely (Nachmany, 2018, p. 5).  
Similarly, in South Africa a lack of good quality data is seen as an impediment to climate change 
policy development and implementation not only for technical reasons but also because ‘the 
credibility of data and quantitative analysis based on that data plays a role in legitimising the 
policy. If questions around data and quantitative analysis can be sustained, so can questions 
around legitimacy of the policy’ (Trollip & Boulle, 2017, pp. 10-11).  Thus, good quality evidence 
may be able to reinforce political will. 
4. Factors that appear not to be significant in building 
political momentum 
Left- or right-wing orientation 
A global analysis of climate legislation and various political factors in 66 countries (11 of which 
are African) found that except in ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries, there was no significant difference in 
the propensity of left-wing versus right-wing governments to legislate on climate change 
(Fankhauser et al., 2015).  In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA, right-wing 
governments tend to engage less with climate change, but this tendency did not hold in other 
countries (Fankhauser et al., 2015, pp. 58-60).  In all countries, left-wing and right-wing 
governments did tend to differ in the policies that they adopt, such as the choice of policy 
instruments, the role of targets, and attitudes towards particular technologies (Fankhauser et al., 
2015, p. 59). 
The business cycle and economic crises 
Fankhauser et al. (2015), in an analysis of climate change legislation enacted in 66 countries 
from 1990-2013, do not find evidence for the role of the business cycle (p. 58) or economic crises 
(p. 60) in affecting governments’ engagement with climate change.  The authors ‘find no 
evidence that the recent economic crisis has affected the number of climate change laws, 
although we can hypothesise that it might have changed their ambition. In some cases, low-
carbon investment might even be seen as a potential fiscal stimulus, particularly by left-wing 
governments, which tend to have a more interventionist approach to economic policy’ 
(Fankhauser et al., 2015, p. 60). 
State administrative capacity 
A global study covering 95 countries found that state administrative capacity does not affect 
governments’ willingness to engage with climate change as an issue: ‘states with low 
administrative capacity are just as likely to adopt climate change policies as states with high 
administrative capacity’ (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 24).   
The effectiveness of policy implementation, on the other hand, may of course be affected by 
state capacity. In Tanzania, for example, ‘insufficient capacity and limited resources impede all 
actors’ ability to carry out their functions efficiently and effectively’, including: integrating 
responses to climate change into national and sectoral policies; designing, implementing, 
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monitoring, and enforcing policies; and coordinating between agencies and levels of government 
(Nachmany, 2018, pp. 1, 5-6)   
Level of democracy 
A regression analysis looking at 95 countries around the world and their adoption of climate 
change mitigation policies indicated that ‘the level of democracy is not a major driver of climate 
change policy adoption’ (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 24)  However, the authors note that the 
existence of free media is associated with responsiveness to climate change, and that 
democracy and free media tend to be linked.  ‘Thus, the conclusion that democracy per se does 
not determine climate change policy does not mean that certain key aspects of democracy, such 
as free media, are not important drivers of policy adoption’ (Steves & Teytelboym, 2013, p. 24). 
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